INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND GENERAL NEEDS
In the event of a massive nuclear attack by an enemy force, the ability of our highly com plex and technologically dependent society to make a rapid and effective recovery will depend upon the survival of a large body of professionally trained people in various strategic centers of the nation, i.e., in government, the military, civil defense, communications, transportation, and hospitals. It has been well established1 that an adequate family-shelter system is an inte gral part of any total defense system against nuclear attack, since it could reduce total civilian casualties by a substantial amount. It is apparent that an adequate family-shelter system is technically feasible and that the cost of constructing or modifying isolated suburban structures to furnish fallout protection would be relatively low. 2 Above-ground protective structures in built-up urban and suburban areas present more complex problems. Population density in these areas is the greatest; and, if the importance of shelters is regarded as proportional to population density, then the need for shelters is very great in and around these areas. A large proportion of skilled technical and professional people live and work in the built-up metropolitan areas, the potential target areas. During normal working hours, these people are concentrated within large industrial complexes, government establishments, and closely grouped multistoried structures typical of the large urban and metropolitan areas. In case of a daylight attack, they would be forced to take shelter in exist ing buildings and structures within these areas.
If a target escapes total destruction from primary effects such as heat, blast, and radiation, the remaining hazard, residual radiation, becomes the critical factor in survival. Therefore re liable information concerning the residual radiation from fallout is necessary to minimize casu alties and to permit rapid restoration of strategic functions. Knowledge of the expected fallout distribution patterns, as well as the relative attenuation factors to be encountered within such building complexes, is vital to the selection of adequate shelter areas and to the planning and execution of the necessary decontamination and cleanup operations.
LACK OF DATA ON GROUPS OF STRUCTURES AND SPECIFIC NEEDS
Previous CETO-sponsored field experiments under actual fallout conditions have provided measurements on the fallout hazard and protection factors of specially constructed shelters, 3 selected materials and types of construction,4 and simple frame buildings exposed to infiniteplane doses. 5 These data have proved to be very valuable in the formulation of recommenda tions for family-shelter programs. This information, however, cannot be directly extrapolated to the situation of the built-up areas containing complex building structures such as those con sidered in this report. Attempts to calculate the fallout protection factors that would exist in these areas have required the assumption of rather broad and arbitrary conditions, the validity of which is difficult to verify without additional experimental data. 6
Fallout protection factors are conspicuously lacking for grouped buildings of various sizes and shapes constructed of different materials and situated in a variety of configurations and locations relative to each other. Similarly data are lacking for fallout distribution in such situ ations. In previous tests involving actual fallout, the fallout distribution has been essentially a two-dimensional infinite-plane dose pattern; whereas, for the situation under consideration, the spatial distribution of the fallout pattern would undoubtedly be three-dimensional in nature.
Although techniques are available for obtaining shielding characteristics for isolated struc tures (e.g., the CETO Mobile Radiological Measurement Unit moving-point-source system), no techniques are available for adequately evaluating the heterogeneous association of buildings characteristic of downtown urban and suburban residential areas, industrial complexes, school campuses, and hospitals.
Weapons effects other than fallout would further complicate the design and structure modi fications needed for adequate protection. This discussion, however, is limited principally to protection against the hazards of residual radiation from fallout.
OBJECTIVES
The study proposed here would explore techniques by which vital experimental data needed to supplement our present knowledge of fallout hazards and protection factors can be supplied. Good data on the mutual shielding characteristics of and the fallout radiation patterns around grouped buildings are important if wise use is to be made of the information obtained from previous studies dealing with combined weapons effects 7 and fallout pattern characteristics. 8 ' 9 It seems obvious that a realistic three-dimensional fallout simulant appropriately distributed over suitable target structures would furnish a rational approach to the problem. Such a simu lant is the principal subject of this report.
Data obtained from a simulant study would provide a cross check of data obtained from weapons fallout at the Nevada Test Site, 10 from fixed multiple sources, 11 from the use of a moving point source, 12 and from theoretical calculations. Such data could also be used in the exploration of the adequacy of a moving-point-source system for measuring shielding charac teristics in multiple-structure situations.
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
A potential future use of fallout simulants may well emerge as the by-product of a study such as the one outlined in this report. Fallout simulants incorporating nuclear-reactionderived isotopes could be used to determine the biological cycling of radioactive materials as they move from the environment to the dinner 
THE FALLOUT SIMULANT PROBLEM
RATIONALE
The lack of information on the distribution of fallout in densely populated areas, the need for the data in developing fallout protective measures in urban and suburban residential and other multiple-structure areas, and the improbability of developing the data from weapons fall out furnish the essential reasons for turning to the consideration of a realistic simulant to sup ply essential data.
Some means of cross-checking data is desirable, especially in situations in which assump tions and approximations must be used in evaluating relevant variables, including effect of the interaction of weather, structure, and complex building arrays on fallout distribution. It re mains to be determined whether or not, and to what extent, some measure of predictability can be established for such situations. Several reasonably probable extreme situations can be im agined. Consider, for example, a block of closely spaced houses all having smooth roof sur faces; consider that a light wind is blowing parallel with the street. Fallout from the roofs and eddies at the cross streets and alley ends of the buildings could create quite a different hazard to occupants of the buildings than a situation in which buildings were in contact, or nearly so, and the roof surfaces were of a material that would retain a maximum of small particles. Such a large number of conditions are possible that it would not be within the scope of this report to try to anticipate them. What is important in any case is a knowledge of the shadowing or mu tual shielding aspects in complex building configurations and of the effects of differing struc tural materials on fallout distribution. The irregularities of both these radiological parameters may prove to be more or less typical and hence predictable within reasonable limits.
FALLOUT DISTRIBUTION
The influence of grouped structures and weather conditions on the distribution of fallout can be studied with a brilliantly colored or fluorescent simulant before further and more com plete studies with a radioactive additive are undertaken. This procedure would be the logical first phase of an operational simulant study. Such a procedure would be important to the de velopment of techniques and operational skills as well as important in obtaining data on the vagaries of fallout distribution in complex situations.
In addition, the use of such a "dummy" simulant in connection with the existing CETO Mobile Radiological Measurement Unit system would provide an experimental means of check ing the adequacy and correctness of th( e source routing for unusual situations in which the assumption of a ground-level infinite-plane dose pattern is obviously not realistic.
MULTIPLE-STRUCTURE SHIELDING CONSIDERATIONS
In a consideration of structure shielding the following observations should be noted: 1. Recently constructed suburban housing tends toward a uniform type of construction with the individual family units being well separated from each other on all sides by open areas. This situation comes closest to previous test conditions using isolated structures exposed to infinite-plane doses of radiation.
2. Older homes located in many urban areas are characteristically built with little or no separation between individual buildings, thus presenting a virtually unbroken wall to the street front.
3. Downtown business areas vary from collections of unrelated small structures closely situated in the small city to large structures or multistoried skyscrapers in metropolitan areas.
If one were to progress from the case for suburban dwellings through many variations to the case for older urban areas and then to downtown business areas, it can readily be seen the self-shielding of a structure becomes less important and that shielding from adjacent struc tures becomes more important, although the relative importance is variable, in a determina tion of over-all protection.
PREPARATION OF A SIMULANT
PROPERTIES AND TEST CONDITIONS
The simulant should be comparable to weapons-produced fallout in the density and particle size at the chosen distance and in the gamma emission energy of the selected isotope or iso topes. Particle size should be chosen so that, with a selected wind structure, particles would be readily deposited in a controlled fashion on the test area with minimum deposition else where.
Realization of the principal objective of the study as outlined will require the availability of a suitable building complex in a good state of repair. The feasibility of any operational phases of this study is further dependent on the availability or development of the site and fa cilities for processing the simulant. The development of suitable spreading techniques is con sidered in Chap. 4. It is assumed for the purpose of this report that the security of a test area during, and subsequent to, any operational runs and any indicated clean-up would present no serious deterrent to the successful completion of the project.
SCALING
In the discussion that follows, all scaling is done according to the scaling rules appearing in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.*-Estimates are based on a 1-Mt surface burst with a con stant 15-mph effective wind velocity. The selected fallout target area2 of about 57,000 ft, which is comparable to eight 50-by 144-ft city lots, can be represented by a circle with a radius of 135 ft situated 60 miles downwind from Ground Zero (GZ). Particle sizes are calculated for an average fall from 80,000 ft. Table 3 .1 shows pertinent data used to arrive at the selected tar get distance of 60 miles downwind.
At this distance a conventional type dwelling would escape even minimal blast and thermal damage but still might receive sufficient fallout that the residual gamma radiation of 100 r/hr would represent a significant hazard to the occupants. It is considered that the ratio between fallout density and expected dose rate at the time of arrival for a distance of 60 miles is opti mal for convenient scaling down of both quantities for reasons of ease of handling, economy in use of radioactive materials, and minimizing hazard to personnel.
No attempt is made to duplicate exactly the time pattern of fallout arrival. Normally fall out is expected to arrive over a period of hours. When a small area is being contaminated with a given amount of airborne simulant, due regard being paid to wind effects, the fallout is treated as having arrived essentially as a single event. For making comparative measurements, such as relative protection factors, attenuations, and related variables, this approach is adequate and offers definite operational advantages. 
MATERIALS AND GENERAL METHOD OF PREPARATION
The base material for the simulant should be similar in physical characteristics to fused soil particles. Sand is a reasonable approximation of fused soil and offers the practical advan tages of availability and ease of handling. Sand and sandlike minerals have previously been used as fallout simulants.
The average particle size is considered to be 150 JLU This size is indicated by an analysis of normal soil. However, since the actual particle size deposited at any given point varies over a considerable range, as well as being dependent on the type of soil, reasonable tolerances above and below 150 ju should be allowed.
It is believed that a single radioactive constituent such as Ba140 La140 is entirely adequate for the type of radiological measurements contemplated. Ba140 La140 offers the advantages of ready availability, ease of handling and detection, and convenient half life. Furthermore, it has a reasonable approximation of the average gamma energy spectrum of close-in fallout. In this respect, although theoretical compilations of early fission-product spectra show a high contri bution by short-lived isotopes with average energy well above the assumed 0.7-Mev average for fallout, 2 such high-energy components are not present in actual gamma spectral analyses of close-in fallout. 3 The quantities of base material and radioactivity per simulant drop can be accurately scaled down for reason of economy, ease of handling, and safety to personnel. It is essential only that the quantity of base material be sufficient to permit ready visual detection of nonuniformity in deposition pattern on various test surfaces of target structures and that the amount of radioactivity be sufficient to provide convenient levels for reliable dosimetry. It is esti mated that to meet these requirements would require a minimum of 75 to 100 Ib of base ma terial and 200 to 400 curies of Ba140 -La140 for each drop.
The minimum quantity of 75 to 100 Ib of base material per drop was arrived at using the following estimates: The total mass of fallout calculated for the target area was 3150 Ib. This quantity is equivalent to approximately 25 g/sq ft. This amount of 150-jut-diameter sand spread evenly would deposit approximately one layer thick. It has been determined experimentally that 0.5 g/sq ft is the minimum that can be detected visually even with a bright dyestuff incor porated. This represents a reduction of 50, which gives 63 Ib as the minimum mass.
The following method of bonding the Ba140 -La140 activity to the simulant base material4 appears to be entirely satisfactory: Screened sand is placed in a heated, rotating cement mixer; the active Ba140 La140 solution is sprayed on and dried; a bonding solution of sodium silicate (water glass) is sprayed on and dried; and the sand is thoroughly mixed. The resulting product is ready for use without further treatment. The principal objection to the use of Monterey type sand for the simulant is that its glasslike nature restricts the radioactive additive almost en tirely to the surface of the granules. Where a relatively weak tracer activity is bonded to a very large quantity of sand, this characteristic would not present a serious problem; but, since in the use outlined in this report a much greater quantity of radioactivity (200 to 400 curies) will be incorporated into a relatively small (75 to 100 Ib) amount of sand, uniform distribution and firm adherence of the active material is of utmost importance.
Owing
In the drying process, it is expected that both the activity and the sodium silicate would be withdrawn into the pores of a volcanic sand, thus ensuring better uniformity and retention. After the sand has been treated with sodium silicate, the final product should have a density approaching that of normal soil.
It is very desirable to incorporate a highly visible substance such as a brightly colored dyestuff or pigment or a fluorescent material into the bonding mixture. The material would serve a twofold purpose: It would serve as a convenient visual or instrumentally measured in dicator in preliminary tests with nonactive simulant to determine the distribution of the fallout simulant in a building complex; and, incorporated into the active simulant, it would permit ready visual detection of significant differences in local deposition patterns, which can then be correlated with actual dose rates obtained by instrumental measurements. Such a visual indi cator material can be very conveniently incorporated in the sodium silicate bonding solution.
PREPARATION OF ACTIVE SOLUTION
The activity probably would be in the form of an acid-soluble salt such as Ba(NO3) 2 or BaCl2 . Since the activity would be applied from a water solution, adequate hot-cell facilities are necessary for this operation. A liquid reservoir for the sprayer would be in the hot cell, connected by Tygon tubing to the mixer, which would be isolated by a thick wall of shielding. Mixer and hot cell would have to be fairly close together to facilitate handling and transit.
QUANTITY OF Ba140 -La140 INVOLVED
It is suggested that ground-level dose rates be 1 to 2 r/hr, a level that would permit meas urements in the area within a 2-to 4-hr period after the simulant reaches the surface.
If a shielding factor of 100 is assumed, a 1 r/hr radiation field would be adequate for reli able data collection with suitable dosimeters within 3 to 4 hr from exposure time, or less, de pending on the sensitivity of the detectors. If the attenuation factor is in the range 100 to 2000, a radiation field of 1 to 2 r/hr would still be satisfactory if low-range ion chambers (0 to 10 mr) were exposed for 3 to 4 hr. However, attenuation factors of 10,000 or more would require proportionately larger dose rates above ground or more sensitive detector systems.
To create a radiation field of 1 or 2 r/hr over the entire target area would require 200 to 400 curies of Ba140 La140 per drop. If more than one drop or higher dose rates should be planned for a given experiment, correspondingly larger quantities of Ba140 La140 would have to be processed and handled.
TRANSPORT OF ACTIVE SIMULANT
The prepared active simulant should be discharged directly into a truck or trailer pro vided with slab shielding behind the driver's compartment and a well type cave shield surround ing the charge container. It is estimated that not more than 15 tons of concrete (or lead bricks) would be adequate shielding on the truck. After the simulant has been transported to the target site, hookup leads should be connected and the charge should be elevated. The truck and crew should then leave the area for check-out and decontamination as needed.
AIR SHOWERING OF A ZONE-MELTED FUEL ELEMENT
Air showering of a zone-melted fuel element is at present being used for Air Force studies involving downwind contamination. 2 Personnel hazards, the long-lived activity of the fallout debris, and the multiple health monitoring processes necessary make this method unsuitable for attaining the objectives of this experiment.
EXPLOSIVE-CHARGE AND RAPID HIGH-PRESSURE GAS-RELEASE SYSTEM SUS PENDED BENEATH A BALLOON OR HELICOPTER
Of the various methods considered, the explosive-charge and the rapid high-pressure gasrelease systems are the two that are recommended for investigation.
Most of the procedures and operational facilities planned or necessary up to actual trans fer of the material from the transportation truck to the distribution system would be exactly the same for both these methods. In general, either the balloon or helicopter discharge sys tem, by explosive charge or rapid high-pressure gas-release devices, can be described in the same manner. However, certain details that are different, would allow a choice of one method over the other based on economic and feasibility factors.
In a review of the two methods, several pertinent points should be considered: 1. Simulant preparation and transportation problems are the same. 2. The basket or container and hookup problems would vary according to the type of dis persal charge and vehicle used. Two dispersal systems have been considered: One is a Primacord directional type explosive unit remotely triggered by a coded tone receiver; the second is a rapid gas-release system triggered in somewhat the same manner. The triggered system would allow a detonation delay so that simulant ejection would take place at the end of a drop cord of specified length. This arrangement would allow reuse of the overhead shield, the tone receiver, and the balloon (if used) with its associated hardware.
3. Balloon positioning could be accomplished by either two or three fixed cable tie points with a central cable for raising and lowering the unit, thus permitting mobility, flexibility, and accurate positioning. The balloon suspension system offers the advantage of remote operation. It is believed that the captive-balloon suspension method would be as satisfactory as any; and it has definite advantages in terms of simplicity, safety, and low cost.
4. Factors to be considered in the use of the helicopter suspension system include crew members, height of burst, and the length of separation cable between simulant package and helicopter. The helicopter would contain radio equipment, radioactive monitoring gear, a deto nation device, and sighting gear. Small preshot changes in wind direction or velocity could be compensated for by ground correction.
5. Regardless of whether the balloon or the helicopter suspension system is used, the dis persal charge must be at a sufficient height to avoid any local blast effects on the target below. It is estimated that a distance of at least 200 ft between the charge and the target would be needed. With the use of light aircraft cable, a single 35-ft balloon should be adequate for loads up to 200 Ib.
Chapter 5 DOSIMETRY
DOSE RATES AND ATTENUATION FACTORS
Approximate dose rates at points of interest, derived by utilizing attenuation factors for a typical residential shelter or house, for various amounts of deposited simulant are given in Table 5 .1, which shows the relation between the amount of Ba140 La140 activity required and the resulting dose rates that would be obtained under various degrees of attenuation. This relation is an approximation for orders of magnitude only and does not take into consideration radiation contributions from areas beyond the test area of 57,000 sq ft.
In a built-up area, mutual shielding by buildings close together would further reduce the effective radius of a uniform field of fallout as opposed to the case of an isolated structure, with the assumption that the simulant would be uniformly distributed over the test area for each case.
The following calculations were used in arriving at the values shown: 1 sq mile = 27,878,400 sq ft; 135-ft radius circle = 57,257 sq ft; and 106 curies/sq miles = 2460 curies/135-ft radius circle.
The average photon energy of a Ba140 La140 equilibrium mixture would be about 1.1 Mev. The dose rate 3 ft above the ground would be approximately 6 r/hr for a uniform contamina tion of 106 curies/sq mile.
DOSIMETRY
In general, dosimetry should be consistent with requirements of related CETO projects. 1 '2 High-level dosimetry (greater than 100-mr total dose) should present no new problems. Tech niques that have proved satisfactory for space and area dosimetry of standing structures in previous CETO exercises would be applicable. Established principles and methods, including the use of teams to minimize individual exposure, adequate radiation protective clothing, means of rapid ingress and egress, should be observed. Owing to the much lower dosage levels (less than 100-mr total dose) expected in high attenuation areas, such as in basements and shelters, special precautions should be taken to prevent the introduction of contamination into them dur ing recovery operations. For this reason remote read-out methods may be advisable in these areas to ensure maximum utilization of the data generated by the simulated fallout field. 
